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Since the invention of Bennett-Brassard 1984
(BB84) protocol [1], many quantum key distri-
bution (QKD) protocols have been proposed [2–
8] and some protocols are operated even in field
environments [9, 10]. One of the striking fea-
tures of QKD is that QKD protocols are prov-
ably secure unlike cryptography based on com-
putational complexity assumptions [11]. It has
been believed that, to guarantee the security of
QKD, Alice and Bob have to monitor the statis-
tics of the measurement outcomes which are used
to determine the amount of the privacy ampli-
fication to generate a key [12]. Recently a new
type of QKD protocol, called round robin differ-
ential phase shift (RRDPS) protocol, was pro-
posed, and remarkably this protocol can gener-
ate a key without monitoring any statistics of the
measurement outcomes [13]. Here we report an
experimental realization of the RRDPS protocol.
We used a setup in which Bob randomly chooses
one from four interferometers with different pulse
delays so that he could implement phase differ-
ence measurements for all possible combinations
with five-pulse time-bin states. Using the setup,
we successfully distributed keys over 30 km of
fiber, making this the first QKD experiment that
does not rely on signal disturbance monitoring.
One may wonder what makes such a fundamentally
big difference in the RRDPS protocol. To answer this
question, let us briefly explain the crux of the RRDPS
protocol. The RRDPS protocol is similar to the original
differential phase shift (DPS) protocol [6] in the sense
that both protocols employ trains of L coherent pulses
as an information carrier sent by the sender (Alice), and
each of the pulses is phase modulated to incur either
0 or π optical phase shift according to Alice’s random
choice. A crucial difference of the RRDPS protocol from
the DPS protocol lies in the receiver (Bob)’s detection
unit. In the DPS protocol, Bob’s setup reads out the
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relative phase of two adjacent pulses, while that of the
RRDPS protocol randomly picks up two pulses among L
pulses and reads out the relative phase of the two pulses.
This random choice puts an additional difficulty on top of
the DPS protocol in eavesdropping, and roughly speaking
the amount of the privacy amplification per sifted key
bit is given by h (ν/(L− 1)), where h(x) := −x log2 x −
(1 − x) log2(1 − x) is the binary entropy function and
ν the total photon number contained in L pulses. This
means in particular that as L increases, the amount of
the privacy amplification decreases. Since the privacy
amplification factor does not depend on the parameters
related to signal disturbance, the RRDPS protocol is in
principle highly robust against channel disturbance for
large L, and it paves a new route toward QKD over long
distances and under much more harsh environment.
The receiver’s setup in the original proposal [13] as-
sumed a single interferometer with an active variable de-
lay, which is not so easy to realize with high speed and
good stability. Here, as the first demonstration, we have
realized a variable delay line up to 4-pulse delay by pas-
sively choosing one interferometer out of four interferom-
eters.
In the RRDPS protocol using a laser source, Alice pre-
pares a packet of L coherent optical pulses and modulates
each pulse with a phase shift of either 0 or π. The state
of the whole packet is given by
|Ψ〉 =
L⊗
k=1
|αeiφk〉k (1)
where |αeiφk〉k denotes the coherent state of the kth
pulse. Here, the amplitude α is related to the average
photon number µ per pulse as |α|2 = µ and the phase
φk = {0, π}. Let ν be the total photon number in a
packet. Then, the probability of finding more than νth
photons in a packet is given by
Pr(ν > νth) ≤ esrc := 1−
νth∑
ν=0
(Lµ)νe−Lµ
ν!
. (2)
Here, νth is an integer constant chosen in the proto-
col. The packet is transmitted over a quantum chan-
nel and sent to Bob. Bob inputs the packet into a de-
layed interferometer whose delay time were randomly
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FIG. 1: Experimental setup for RRDPS QKD. IM: intensity modulator, PM: phase modulator, ATT: attenuator, D: 250-ps
delay line, SSPD: superconducting single photon detectors. Inset: pulse interference at MT -delay interferometer (L = 5,
M = 2, T = 500 ps).
chosen from {T, 2T, · · · , (L − 1)T }, where T is the tem-
poral interval between adjacent pulses. When the MT -
delay (M ∈ {1, 2, · · · , L − 1}) is chosen, Bob observes
photon interferences in L − M slots (see inset in Fig.
1). At those time slots, a photon is output from the
port 0 (1) when the phase difference between the ith
(i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , L −M}) and (i+M)th pulses was 0 (π).
Bob recognizes a photon detection events as one bit of
sifted key when they are in the interference slots, and
records the time slot, the detected port, and the delay
used in the measurement. After repeating the same pro-
cedure many times, Bob announces over an authenticated
classical channel to Alice the indices of the successfully
detected packets together with the recorded time slots
and delays. This is enough for Alice to determine her
sifted key from her record of the phase shifts applied on
the transmitted pulses.
Eve’s knowledge on the sifted key can be bound by the
argument in [13], which is summarized as follows. We can
regard each bit of Alice’s sifted key as the outcome of the
Z-basis measurement on a virtual qubit. The probabil-
ity of the qubit being found in state |0〉 − |1〉 if it were
measured in the X basis is called the “phase error rate,”
and it determines a sufficient amount of privacy ampli-
fication. It can be shown that the phase error rate is
bounded by νth/(L− 1) when the number of photons in
a packet is no larger than νth [13]. Then, the phase error
rate for the use of light source satisfying Eq.(2) can be
no larger than
eph =
esrc
Q
+
(
1− esrc
Q
)
νth
L− 1 , (3)
Q = N/Nem (4)
where N is the sifted key length and Nem is the num-
ber of packets emitted from Alice. The first term of Eq.
(3) corresponds to the fraction of a sifted key where the
number of emitted photons in a packet may have ex-
ceeded νth and thus has to be regarded as a phase error
in the worst case scenario. The net secure key length in
the asymptotic limit is then given by
G = N [1− fh(ebit)− h(eph)] , (5)
where ebit is the bit error rate and f corresponds to the
parameter related to the efficiency of the employed er-
ror correcting code. Eqs. (3) and (5) indicates that the
privacy amplification factor for the RRDPS protocol de-
pends only on the photon number characteristics of the
source, the length of the packet, and the sifted key rate,
while it is independent of the error rate. In this manner,
the RRDPS protocol does not require the phase error
estimation using the randomly sampled test bits unlike
other QKD protocols, and thus possibly simplifies the
system significantly.
Figure 1 shows the experimental setup. Alice gener-
ated optical pulses with 60 ps temporal width at a clock
frequency of 2 GHz by modulating a 1551.1-nm coherent
light from an external cavity diode laser using a lithium
niobate intensity modulator. The time interval between
the adjacent pulses is T = 0.5 ns. The phases of the
pulses were modulated by 0 or π using a lithium niobate
phase modulator driven by a signal from a 2-GHz pseudo-
random bit pattern (PRBS) generator. Then, the pulse
train was launched into an optical attenuator so that the
average photon number per pulse became much less than
1. We defined a packet for every 5 pulses (L = 5) in the
pulse train, and assigned “packet number” and “time slot
3Packet number
Time slot number 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Phase modulation pi 0 pi pi 0 0 pi 0 0 0 pi 0 pi pi 0
Interference pattern (T delay) 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
Interference pattern (2T delay) 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
Interference pattern (3T delay) 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
Interference pattern (4T delay) 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
n-1 n n+1
FIG. 2: Example of packet configuration and interference pat-
tern at each interferometer.
number” to each packet and pulse for the data processing
(Fig. 2). The packets were then sent to Bob through a
transmission fiber.
Since we set L = 5, Bob needs to randomly choose
one from four delay length {T, 2T, 3T, 4T } in a variable-
delay interferometer in the implementation in the origi-
nal paper [13]. In this experiment, we employed a pas-
sive configuration that composed of a 1-input, 4-output
optical splitter followed by 4 interferometers that have
{0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0}-ns temporal delays. Note that a sim-
ilar multi-interferometer configuration was proposed to
increase the probability of error caused by the intercept-
and-resend attack against the DPS protocol [14]. Since a
valid outcome in the RRDPS protocol is generated when
a packet contains a single photon, the role of the optical
splitter can be regarded as routing the packet randomly
to one of the 4 interferometers. The delayed interferom-
eters used in the experiment were fabricated using sil-
ica waveguide, and thus a precise and stable phase ad-
justment was possible [15]. The photons from two out-
put ports of each interferometer were then received by
superconducting single photon detectors (SSPD) based
on NbN nanowires (Scontel). Although 8 detectors are
needed for the passive configuration with 4 interferom-
eters, we employed a temporal multiplexing technique
to reduce the required number of detectors by half. As
shown in Fig. 1, a port from T -delay (3T -delay) in-
terferometer was delayed by 250 ps and combined with
that from 4T -delay (2T -delay) interferometer using a 3-
dB coupler, and input into an SSPD. The drawback of
this temporal multiplexing is an additional 3-dB loss in-
duced by the coupler. The detection signals from each
SSPD were input into a time interval analyzer (Pico-
quant) for recording the detection time instances and
which-detector information. The detection efficiencies of
the SSPDs were around 19% at a dark count rate of ∼ 2
cps. The overall system loss (including the detection effi-
ciencies of SSPDs) was 12.7 dB. We applied a 200-ps time
window to the obtained data to reduce the contribution
of dark counts.
Figure 2 is an example of interference pattern that is
observed by Bob. Although we can observe interference
in every time slot (as in original DPS protocol), we only
use detection events that are obtained from the interfer-
ence between two pulses within the same packet, which
are shown by yellow cells in Fig. 2. When we observe
only one detection event in the yellow cells for a packet,
we record the event as a new bit of the sifted key. We can
estimate the frequency of Bob receiving two or more pho-
tons in a packet by observing the “double clicks” between
the detection events at detectors “Ch 1 or Ch 2” and “Ch
3 or Ch 4” in yellow cells in a packet. Note that such an
event does not produce a bit of the sifted key. When the
number of double-click events is Nd, the fraction in the
N -bit sifted key that originated from the multi-photon
received packets is no larger than qd := 8Nd/N . The
modified secure key length in the asymptotic limit that
takes account of qd is given by (see Method for details)
G = N [1− fh(ebit)− qd − (1− qd)h(e′ph)], (6)
e′ph =
esrc
Q(1− qd) +
(
1− esrc
Q(1− qd)
)
νth
L− 1 . (7)
The parameter qd was included in the calculation of the
amount of privacy amplification in our experiments, but
the effect was almost negligible since qd was less than
10−3 in all the runs.
We undertook key generation experiments with various
channel loss values. At each loss, we performed sifted key
generation for an effective data acquisition time of 260
s. We optimized the average photon number per pulse
for each loss as in Fig. 3 (b) to maximize the secure
key length based on the calculation described in Method.
Figure 3 (c) shows the error rate as a function of channel
loss. The error rate at 0 channel loss was 1.5%, which
was limited by the imperfect extinction ratio of the de-
layed interferometers. The asymptotic secure key rate
obtained in the experiment is plotted in Fig. 3 (a), where
squares and circles denote fiber transmissions and optical
attenuation, respectively. Here, we calculated secure key
rates using Eq. (6) with experimentally obtained sifted
key lengths, error rates and the numbers of double-click
events, with the assumption of f = 1.1. The results indi-
cate that asymptotically we can generate secure keys up
to 8.7 dB channel loss, and secure key distribution over
a 30-km fiber was realized.
We then have analyzed the security accommodating
the effect arising from the finiteness of the sifted key
length, with a choice of the security parameter d = 2−50.
The detailed procedure of finite-key security analysis is
shown in Method. We first performed the analysis on
the same data shown in Fig. 3. The obtained secure key
length is shown in Fig. 4 (a). It shows that we success-
fully generated secure keys up to 20 km of fiber (4.7 dB
loss) with finite-key effect considered. We also undertook
measurements with varied data acquisition times at 0-dB
transmission loss and 20-km fiber transmission to assess
the sifted key length dependence on the secure key. The
result is shown in Fig. 4 (b), where the fraction of the se-
cure key length obtained with finite-key security analysis
relative to the asymptotic secure key length is plotted as
410
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FIG. 3: Experimental results. (a) Secure key rate per pulse in the limit of asymptotic key length as a function of transmission
loss. (b) Average photon number per pulse used in the experiments for each transmission loss. (c) Bit error rate as a function
of transmission loss. In (a) - (c), the squares and circles denote fiber transmissions and optical attenuation, respectively. The
solid curves in (a)-(c) are calculated from Eq. (6) with the average photon number per pulse optimized to maximize the secure
key rate at each transmission loss (see also Method)
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FIG. 4: Results of finite-key security analysis. (a) Secure key
length as a function of transmission loss for a effective data
acquisition time of 260 s. Squares: 20-km fiber transmission,
circles: optical attenuation. (b) Fraction of the secure key
length obtained with finite-key security analysis relative to
the asymptotic secure key length as a function of sifted key
length. Circles and squares denote 0-dB transmission loss and
20-km fiber transmission.
a function of the sifted key length. When the fiber length
is 0 (denoted by circles), the fraction was 50% and 93%
for sifted key lengths of 420 kbits (effective data acquisi-
tion time: 26 s) and 21 Mbits (1300 s), respectively. We
also obtained a secure key fraction of 80% at 20-km fiber
length with a sifted key length of 5.1 Mbits taken in a
2600-s data acquisition time.
The analysis in [13] predicted that the performance of
the RRDPS protocol can be superior to BB84 protocols
with decoy states at large error rate. However, in our
experiment with L = 5 and the baseline system error of
1.5%, the secure key compression factor in the asymp-
totic limit 1 − fh(ebit) − h(eph) is ∼ 0.94 even if eph is
assumed to be 1/4 (i.e. νth = 1 and no multi-photons
emitted in a packet). This means that our experiment
was already close to the edge of secure key generation
with the relatively small L. By using larger L, we can im-
prove the performance of a RRPDS system significantly.
Let us assume an RRPDS system with a delayed inter-
ferometer whose delay length can be actively changed as
in the original proposal [13]. We assumed that the dark
count rate per detector, system loss and transmission loss
are 2 cps, 12.7 dB and 4.7 dB (corresponding to 20 km
fiber in our experiment), respectively, and calculated the
maximum system error rate with which we can obtain
secure key for each L. The result is shown in Table S1 in
Supplementary Information. It is obvious that the tol-
erable error rate becomes much higher as we increase L.
The finite-key effect is also improved for a large L. For
example, at 20-km fiber length and L = 32, 60% of the
asymptotic key rate is achieved with the sifted key length
of only 3 × 104. Thus, if we implement larger L, we can
expect significant improvement in the performance.
The use of optical waveguide technologies will facilitate
the implementation of a larger number of delays. Silica-
waveguide-based optical delay lines whose lengths are as
long as 4 m with a footprint of only 63 mm × 12 mm
have already been reported [16]. With a 10-GHz clock
QKD system which has been reported in [17], we can
implement ∼ 200T delay line with a 4-m waveguide. By
incorporating with a fast optical switch whose bandwidth
can be more than 10 GHz using silica-lithium niobate hy-
brid integration technology [18], we can realize a RRDPS
system with >100 delays.
Note that the present QKD setup is not “secure” as
a whole system, which is mainly because we employed a
PRBS as the phase modulation signal. In addition, we
need to implement error correction and privacy amplifi-
cation to claim the realization of full-QKD system. The
former problem may be solved by the use of quantum ran-
dom number generators, and the latter can be solved by
the direct application of the existing software/hardware
for the key distillation. Other issues in the present setup
5are security loopholes, that is, we have assumed that all
the devices in the experiment operate as the theory re-
quire. In particular, we have assumed that there is no
side-channel. Unfortunately, however, this is not the case
in practice. For instance, the detection unit might be
fragile against the so-called blight pulse illumination at-
tacks, and imperfect phase/amplitude modulation by Al-
ice might degrade the performance of the present setup.
These are shared issues in most of the QKD experiments,
and we hope in future that there will come out counter-
measures to waive these problems. Even under these is-
sues, the importance of the present experiments lies in
the fact it confirmed the possibility of key generation
with the fundamentally new QKD scheme, which paves
a new route toward QKD systems under harsher environ-
ment.
Methods
Security proof outline. We show an outline of a secu-
rity proof against general attacks for the implementation
used in the present experiment. There are two points
which differentiate this experiment from one proposed
in [13]. First, Bob does not use an interferometer with
an actively-controlled variable delay line but employs a
passive optical splitter followed by several interferome-
ters with various temporal delays. As long as the num-
ber of photons received in a packet is one, this change
does not make any difference in security proof because
the positive operator-valued measure (POVM) charac-
terizing this measurement is the same with that using
the variable delay line. Second, Bob cannot measure the
number of photons directly because he uses threshold de-
tectors, whereas the proof in [13] assumes the use of de-
tectors that can discriminate a single photon from two or
more photons. This is the point where extra considera-
tion is needed, since we need to estimate the number of
the received packets containing one photon using thresh-
old detectors.
We define a double-click event as a coincidence between
a detection event at “Ch1 or Ch2” and one at “Ch3 or
Ch4”, both in the interference slots (yellow cells in Fig.
2) of the same packet. We assume that all 4 detectors
have the same detection efficiency. This can be modeled
by detectors with unit efficiency and a common linear
absorber in front of Bob’s apparatus. In Table I, we show
the probability that a photon in each pulse goes to each
interferometer and is detected in the interference slots.
We see that the probability that a photon in a packet
is detected at “Ch1 or Ch2” is 1/4 regardless of which
pulse the photon is in. The same is true for “Ch3 or
Ch4”. This means that a lower bound of the probability
of a double-click event is 1/8 when there are two or more
photons received in a packet.
Although the actual measurement device cannot dis-
criminate the photon number, it is in principle possible
to measure the total photon number in each packet in
TABLE I: The probability that a photon in each pulse goes to
each interferometer and is detected in the interference slots.
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
T delay (“Ch1 or Ch2”) 1/8 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/8
2T delay (“Ch3 or Ch4”) 1/8 1/8 1/4 1/8 1/8
3T delay (“Ch3 or Ch4”) 1/8 1/8 0 1/8 1/8
4T delay (“Ch1 or Ch2”) 1/8 0 0 0 1/8
front of Bob’s apparatus without affecting any procedure
in the protocol. Hence we may, in principle, tag every
packet that includes two or more photons. Let NmB be
the number of tagged ones among the Nem packets re-
ceived by Bob, andNd be the observed number of double-
click events. In the asymptotic limit of large NmB, we
may assume that NmB is no larger than 8Nd. The secure
key is obtained by subtracting the same number of bits
[19] in the privacy amplification, leading to a modified
formula for the secure key length given by Eqs. (6) and
(7).
Performance estimation with experimental pa-
rameters. In order to estimate the performance, we
need to assume a channel model to determine the ex-
pected asymptotic values of Q, ebit, and pd := Nd/Nem.
We denote dc and esys as the dark count rate of the SSPD
(per channel) and the baseline system error rate, respec-
tively. We then assume that the sifted key rate per packet
and the bit error rate are approximated with the follow-
ing equations.
Q ≃ Lµη
2
+ (L− 1)Ldc (8)
ebit ≃
Lµη
2 esys + (L− 1)Ldc/2
Q
(9)
pd ≃ (Lµη)2/16 (10)
Using these assumptions, we optimize µ to obtain a se-
cure key rate.
Finite-key security analysis. We will obtain a secure
key length Gf and a security parameter d from 6 pro-
tocol parameters N¯d, N¯mB, N¯mA, N¯ph, sx, and sz. As the
security parameter d, we adopt half the trace distance
between the actual state ρABE and an ideal state ρ
ideal
ABE .
We define a function for the tail distribution for finding
no fewer than k successes in a binomial distribution as
f(k;n, p) :=
∑
j≥k
pj(1− p)n−j
(
n
j
)
. (11)
If k/n > p, it is bounded by f(k;n, p) ≤ 2−nD(k/n‖p),
where D(q ‖ p) := q log2(q/p) + (1− q) log2{(1− q)/(1−
p)}. The similar function for no more than k successes is
g(k;n, p) :=
∑
j≤k
pj(1− p)n−j
(
n
j
)
, (12)
which is bounded by g(k;n, p) ≤ 2−nD(k/n‖p) if k/n < p.
6After a sifted-key generation session is finished, Bob
first examines the number of double-click events Nd. If
it is larger than a pre-defined threshold N¯d, Alice and
Bob discard the key.
We analyze two cases separately according to the num-
ber NmB of multi-photon packets (the tagged packets)
received by Bob’s apparatus. If NmB is larger than a pre-
defined threshold N¯mB, Alice and Bob should discard the
sifted key at least with a probability 1 − ǫ1, where ǫ1 is
defined as
ǫ1 := g(N¯d; N¯mB, 1/8). (13)
Since producing no key is regarded as an ideal state, the
security parameter is bounded as d ≤ ǫ1.
For the case with NmB ≤ N¯mB, we can choose N ′ :=
N − N¯mB untagged packets from the N packets resulting
in the N -bit sifted key. We then apply the security argu-
ment in [13] to these N ′ packets, which is summarized as
follows. For each of the Nem packets emitted from Alice,
we may assume that Alice is left with L qubits such that
measurement of each qubit in the standard basis {|0〉, |1〉}
would reveal the corresponding phase shift {0, π}. On
the other hand, the statistics of the L qubits measured
in the {|+〉, |−〉} basis, where |±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉), are
related to the property of the light source. Let n− be
the number of qubits found in state |−〉. Then we have
Prob(n− > νth) ≤ esrc. Whenever Bob succeeds in detec-
tion, Alice may convert the L qubits into a single qubit
(we call it a sifted qubit) and then measures it in the
standard basis to determine her sifted key bit. For the
purpose of proving the security, we ask what happens
if Alice measures the sifted qubit in {|+〉, |−〉} basis in-
stead. We call the outcome for state |−〉 a phase error. It
was shown [13] that the probability of obtaining a phase
error is no larger than n−/(L− 1). Then the security of
the final key generated from the N ′ sifted key bits can
be related to the failure probability pfail of correcting the
phases errors in the corresponding N ′ sifted qubits.
The total number of phase errors in theN ′ sifted qubits
is estimated as follows. For each of the Nem packets
emitted from Alice, n− exceeds νth at most with proba-
bility esrc . Therefore, the number NmA of packets with
n− > νth is no larger than a pre-defined threshold value
N¯mA, except for a small probability defined by
ǫ2 := f(N¯mA;Nem, esrc). (14)
This means that, except for the probability ǫ2, at least
N ′′ := N ′ − N¯mA packets among the N ′ sifted packets
satisfy n− ≤ νth. We define Nph as the number of phase
errors in the N ′′ packets. The number Nph should be
no larger than a pre-defined threshold N¯ph with a prob-
ability no smaller than 1 − ǫ2 − ǫ3, where ǫ3 is defined
as
ǫ3 := f
(
N¯ph;N
′′,
νth
L− 1
)
. (15)
Since it makes the total number of phase errors in the N ′
sifted qubits no larger than N¯mA + N¯ph, a virtual phase
error correction with a syndrome length
N ′h
(
N¯mA + N¯ph
N ′
)
+ sx (16)
will succeed at least with 1−pfail, where pfail := ǫ2+ǫ3+ηx
and ηx := 2
−sx .
As a result, for the case with NmB ≤ N¯mB, the secure
key length with the finite-length effect taken into account
is given by
Gf = N
′ − fNh(ebit)− sz −N ′h
(
N¯mA + N¯ph
N ′
)
− sx,
(17)
where sz = − log2 ηz bits are used for a verification of the
bit error correction. The security parameter is bounded
as d ≤ ηz +
√
2
√
pfail [12].
Since any attack by Eve can be regarded as a mixture
of the two cases analyzed above, d is always bounded as
d ≤ max(ǫ1, ηz +
√
2
√
ǫ2 + ǫ3 + ηx). (18)
To obtain the numerical results in this paper, we set
N¯d to be Nempd + 3
√
Nempd, which makes the probabil-
ity of discarding the protocol negligibly small. We fixed
ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3, ηx, and ηz to be 2
−50, 2−103/3, 2−103/3, 2−103/3,
and 2−51, respectively. Then we determined the values
of N¯mB, N¯mA, N¯ph, sx, and sz to satisfy Eqs. (13), (14),
(15), and the definitions of ηx and ηz. This achieves the
condition d ≤ 2−50.
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8Supplementary Information
S1: Performance improvement with larger number
of delays
We assume a setup that uses a single interferometer
with an actively controlled variable delay followed by two
single photon detectors as proposed in [13]. With this
setup, the sifted key rate per packet and the bit error
rate are given by
Q =
Lµη
2
+ Ldc, (19)
ebit =
Lµη
2 esys + Ldc/2
Q
. (20)
We assume that the system loss, the fiber loss (20 km),
and the dark count rate per detector are the same as the
experiment, 12.7 dB, 4.7 dB, and 2 cps, respectively. We
also assume the use of 200-ps time window. Using Eqs.
(6)-(7), (10), (19) and (20), we calculated the maximum
system error rate for each L with which we can obtain
any key. The result is shown in Table S1.
TABLE S1: The maximum system error rate to obtain any
secure key for each L
L esys
5 2.3%
16 13.3%
32 18.6%
64 22.1%
128 24.4%
